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ASPECTS OF MERGER IN THE LAW
OF KIDNAPPING
Frank J. Parker, S.J.-
And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found
in his hand, he shall surely be put to death.
Exodus, 21:16
Legal authorities have always seconded the above-quoted Penta-
teuchal condemnation of kidnapping.1 Difficulty occurs, however, when
a court must decide if kidnapping, with its attendant heavy punish-
ment, has been committed in a particular case. The question whether
a kidnapping offense should merge with, and thereby become extin-
guished in, a murder, robbery, rape, or other felony has received two
entirely different answers in the last few years. In New York felonious
kidnapping was usually not found unless there was an attempt to
collect ransom or reward. At the other extreme, California, and states
following its lead, demonstrated little reluctance in punishing, even
to the extent of the gas chamber, any violation of the kidnapping laws
that exceeded the truly incidental. A statutory change in New York
and a new interpretation of the California double punishment law have,
in practice, decreased the polarization of viewpoints, but it would be
wrong to conclude that the previously existing problems have been
eliminated. A detailed examination of the old problems suggests that
the current approach-one of legislative and judicial fiat-has not
solved the problems and that they may well reoccur.
t Lecturer, Boston College Graduate School of Social Work; Instructor, Boston Col-
lege School of Management. B.S. 1962, Holy Cross College; J.D. 1965, Fordham Law
School.
1 Kidnapping, a common law misdemeanor, was defined by Blackstone as "the
forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child, from their own coun-
try and sending them into another." W. BLACRSTONE, COMMENTARMS ON THE LAWS OF ENc-
LAND 219 (8th ed. 1778). Early in the statutory development of the law, kidnapping was
raised to a felony. Later, the requirement that the victim be carried out of the country
was eliminated, and kidnapping came to be defined as "the stealing and carrying away
of any person." E. EAsT, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429 (London ed. 1803).
Kidnapping to obtain a reward or ransom is not dealt with in this article. Instead,
emphasis will be placed upon those cases in which the act of kidnapping occurs (whether
by design or not) in conjunction with the commission of a separate and distinct felony.
Only the substantive aspects of the probleni are covered. As with many other crimes, sen-
tencing practices in this area tend to be confusing, and a detailed coverage of sentencing
would necessitate the introduction of concepts and considerations extraneous to the
matter at hand.
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I
THE BACKGROUND OF NEW YORK'S APPROACH
One night in 1950 Michael Florio mounted the steps of a
Manhattan brownstone and enticed a girl visiting in the house to
come outside to meet a friend of hers, who allegedly was sitting in
the car. Although she recognized none of the occupants, all of whom
were male, the girl entered the vehicle. Against her will, she was driven
to a remote spot in the neighboring borough of Queens and raped
by all four occupants.
Reviewing the four defendants' convictions, the New York Court
of Appeals found "true kidnapping in the popular understanding as
well as the legal 'spirit and intent' of the law."2 The court began
with the basic kidnapping definition and established that there was a
willful detention for an unlawful purpose against the victim's will
and without authority of law. Once this was done, it was a simple
step to sustain the kidnapping conviction under the statute then in
effect.
The defendants' argument that their purpose was to commit first
degree rape and that the act of kidnapping was incidental and should
not form the basis of a felony conviction fell on deaf ears. Judge Conway
pointed out in support of the court's holding that if the Court of
Appeals accepted the defendants' argument, there was a real danger
that in future cases a defendant might circumvent the harsher punish-
ment received for kidnapping by raping his female victim. The Court
of Appeals also cited with approval People v. Hope,3 in which the
victims were forced to drive one mile before they were rescued, and
People v. Small,4 in which the quick-thinking victim drove his car
into a traffic signal at an intersection within one minute of his seizure.
In each case kidnapping convictions were upheld because, as stated in
Hope:
The object of the statute and of the common law on the subject
was the same, to secure the personal liberty of citizens and to secure
to them the assistance of the law necessary to release them from
unlawful restraint. 5
The Court of Appeals continued this line of reasoning in Florio and
left no doubt that New York would take a hard-line approach in cases
2 People v. Florio, 801 N.Y. 46, 49, 92 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1950).
8 257 N.Y. 147, 177 N.E. 402 (1931).
4 274 N.Y. 551, 10 N.E.2d 546, 294 N.YS. 347 (1937).
5 257 N.Y. at 152, 177 N.E. at 404.
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involving both a technical act of kidnapping and the commission of a
separate felony.6
The kidnapping aspects of Florio were not examined until 1965,
when People v. Levy 7 unobtrusively arrived on the scene. The facts in
Levy were unremarkable. A wealthy couple returning home by car to
their Fifth Avenue apartment house were confronted by two gunmen,
who pushed them back into their car as they attempted to alight. In
the next twenty minutes, the gunmen forced them to drive twenty-
seven blocks through upper Manhattan while robbing the woman's
earrings and two finger rings, as well as three-hundred dollars from her
husband.
On first appraisal, Levy does not appear noteworthy. Although
the force used and the time and distance of confinement are not as
substantial as in Florio, unquestionably the concept of kidnapping is
more fully developed in Levy than in Hope and Small, in which kid-
napping convictions were sustained even though almost immediate
capture frustrated the plans of the criminals. On review, however, the
Court of Appeals decided that the twenty-seven blocks and twenty
minutes of confinement in Levy were incidental to the underlying
crime of robbery and dismissed the kidnapping charges. The court
reasoned that since the New York kidnapping statute was broadly
6 Judge Desmond, dissenting in Florio, made the interesting argument that abduction
rather than kidnapping should have been charged. At one time these crimes appeared
side-by-side in the Penal Code and were punishable by the same sentence (2 Rev. Stat.
of N.Y. [1829], pt. I, ch. I, tit. II, §§ 25, 28), but at the time of Florio they were not
together and the maximum penalty for kidnapping was twice that for abduction (N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 70, 1250 (McKinney 1967)). Judge Desmond's most significant arguments
were, first, that to prosecute abduction as kidnapping would defeat a legislative policy as
to "other evidence." A kidnapping conviction could rest on the uncorroborated testimony
of the victim alone, but such testimony was insufficient to sustain a rape conviction.
Second, he argued that defendants could not be found guilty of both kidnapping and
abduction, since to do so would deprive the legislature of its power to specify different
punishments for distinct crimes. The majority did not agree. Citing People ex rel. Howey
v. Warden of City Prison, 207 N.Y. 354, 101 N.E. 167 (1913), the majority suggested that
the seizing of a -female for a single act of intercourse did not constitute abduction. In any
case, it thought it perfectly acceptable, under People v. Hines, 284 N.Y. 93, 105, 29 NE.2d
483, 489 (1940), to charge kidnapping instead of abduction. Arguments based on Judge
Desmond's dissent were subsequently rejected in two New Jersey cases. State v. Gibbs, 79
N.J. Super. 315, 191 A.2d 495 (1963) (abduction limited to forced taking for marriage or
"defilement," presumably the forced taking of a female to accomplish a forced marriage to
the taker or another or forced intercourse with one other than the taker); State v. John-
son, 67 NJ. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (1961) (abduction and kidnapping overlap, but
prosecution has moral obligation not to charge kidnapping unless offense warrants the
harsh punishment). For an explanation of this subject see 1 C.J.S. Abduction §§ 1-15
(1936).
7 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1965).
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drafted in order to encompass every conceivable case of "true" kid-
napping, not every act falling within the statute's terms should be
treated as felonious kidnapping.8 It was apprehensive that the act of
kidnapping might technically occur during commission of the felonies
of rape, robbery, and in some instances assault, since detention and
sometimes confinement accompany an assault. To emphasize this point,
the fourteen-year-old case of Florio was explicitly overruled in order
to "limit the application of the kidnapping statute to 'kidnapping' in
the conventional sense in which the term has now come to have ac-
quired meaning.""
Since in 1965 a majority of states would have held the events in
Levy to constitute kidnapping, Levy is a clear departure from the
traditional notion of the crime. It is unfortunate that Judge Bergan,
writing for the Levy majority, did not define the court's idea of "kid-
napping in the conventional sense" in 1965. A definition can be at-
tempted, however, beginning with what the Court of Appeals says
is not felonious kidnapping. First of all, a detention of twenty-seven
blocks and twenty minutes in order to rob-the Levy situation-is not
felonious kidnapping. Second, a detention from Manhattan to Queens
in order to commit rape-the Florio situation-is not felonious kid-
napping. On the other hand, the court approves the findings of kid-
napping in Hope and Small. It thus appears that whether there was a
kidnapping cannot be determined from time and distance alone. In
both Hope and Small, less than two minutes and a quarter of a mile
elapsed before capture. The fact that distinguishes Hope and Small
from Florio and Levy is that no conceivable felony other than kidnap-
ping appears from the facts in Hope and Small, whereas the felonies
of robbery and rape appear as separate crimes in Levy and Florio
respectively. This conclusion indicates that the technical act of kid-
napping will often merge into an underlying felony. Felonious kidnap-
ping will be found, however, when the purpose of the seizure is to
collect a ransom. By deduction it appears that the only time the
kidnapping charge will be subjected to severe judicial scrutiny is when
another felony is also committed. So long as no felony other than
kidnapping appears on the facts, it is immaterial whether apprehension
occurs before any possible attempt to collect a reward.
8 In basic concept the crime of kidnapping envisages the asportation of a person
under restraint and compulsion. Usually the complete control of the person and
the secrecy of his location are means of facilitating extortion. But since the
control may be accomplished in a variety of ways, the New York statute has been
drafted in very broad terms.
Id. at 164, 204 N.E.2d at 843-44, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
9 Id. at 164-65, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
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Levy does not stand for the proposition that there is an automatic
merger and extinguishment of the felony of kidnapping in any case
in which a conviction for a separate felony will lie. The decision goes
on to state that it is possible for situations to arise in which kidnapping
could be sustained along with a conviction for a separate underlying
felony. However, the case chosen by the court to illustrate this prin-
ciple, People v. Black,10 is so incredibly bizarre that one must wonder
whether the court is saying, in effect, that where defendant is found
guilty of a separate felony, only one case in a thousand will support
an additional conviction for kidnapping:
[D]efendant [Black] had entered as a burglar the home of his
victims (a husband and wife) and had shot the husband in the head
twice as he lay sleeping; . . . when the pregnant wife appeared from
another part of the house to investigate, defendant at point-blank
range shot at her but missed; ... defendant then tore out all the
telephone wires and bound the wounded man, rifled the room for
valuables and fled in his victims' car, forcing the wife to accompany
him and leaving the wounded man and an infant in a crib despite
the wife's pleas that she be permitted to care for them or to make a
call to a doctor to try to save her husband's life.
Defendant was apprehended in Connecticut several hours later
after he had crashed the stolen car during a chase in which, with
his hostage beside him, he drove at speeds up to 100 miles an
hour.11
If the facts of Black exemplify the aggravation necessary to constitute
a double felony in this area, it is abundantly clear that merger was
generally applicable in New York at that time.12
New York courts followed Levy until the revised New York Penal
Law and Criminal Code became effective on September 1, 1967. In the
two and one-half years that Levy dominated the kidnapping scene,
New York was most reluctant to find the felony of kidnapping in cases
in which a separate underlying felony was also committed. An apt
illustration of this statement is provided by People v. Lombardi,13 the
most important case on the point during this period.
Lombardi's resemblances in fact pattern to Florio are truly star-
10 18 App. Div. 2d 719, 236 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dep't 1962).
11 Id. at 720, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
12 Writing for the three dissenting judges in Levy, Judge Burke pointed out:
The [kidnapping] statute was designed to provide additional punishment for
and thus reduce the usage of the professional criminal practice of detaining
the victim of a crime in order to assure the safety of the flight of the criminal
by preventing an outcry by the victim and the possibility of pursuit. This de-
cision encourages such a practice.
15 N.Y.2d at 167, 204 N..2d at 845-46, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
13 20 N.Y.2d 266, 229 N.E.2d 206, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1967).
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tling. As in Florio, a woman was enticed to enter the defendant's car in
Manhattan and driven to Queens where sexual assault occurred. In this
case, Lombardi, a combination pharmacist-travel agent, had on separate
occasions ordered three of his female employees to travel with him from
Manhattan to attend parties in Queens in order to stir up business
for his travel agency. On each occasion, before entering the car, he
gave the girl a pill which he claimed was a nail-hardening pill. Actually,
the pill contained a drug that caused a state of euphoria in users.
While the woman was in this condition, he took her to a motel in
Queens and sexually molested her. In one case he attempted to rape
the unfortunate employee. Lombardi made the mistake of distributing
his "nail-hardening pill" a fourth time. This time the recipient was
a plainclothes policewoman.
Lombardi was convicted on three counts of kidnapping, three
counts of actual and one count of attempted assault in the second
degree, and one count of attempted rape in the first degree. The case
reached the Court of Appeals after the appellate division had upheld
the convictions below. Extending the rationale of Levy almost to its
breaking point, the Court of Appeals in another four to three decision
dismissed the kidnapping charges.
If this case had occurred before the Levy decision, there is little
question that the kidnapping conviction would have been upheld.
Even after Levy, it is surprising that kidnapping was not treated as
a separate felony in this case in view of the lengthy time during which
the female employees were detained forcibly, ranging from ten hours in
one instance to a period of over twelve and closer to fifteen hours
in the other two instances. It does not appear to be overly cynical,
at this point, to suggest that the majority on the Court of Appeals
subscribed more in theory than in fact to the proposition that there
were circumstances in which they would sustain a conviction for kid-
napping as well as a conviction for the underlying felony.
As in Levy, Judge Bergan wrote the majority opinion in Lom-
bardi.14 The major contention of the Loambardi majority was that the
14 Judge Bergan's opinions in Levy and Lombardi are similar; in each he begins
by agreeing that defendant technically violated the kidnapping laws. Having conceded
this point, he notes the trend in kidnapping cases to limit the felony to true kidnapping
situations, but no attempt is made to substantiate the asserted trend by citing specific
cases from other jurisdictions.
In the interim between the decisions in the Levy and Lombardi cases, Judge Des-
mond and Judge Dye left the Court of Appeals. One new member, ex-United States
Senator Kenneth Keating, voted with the Lombardi majority. The other new member,
Judge Breitel, voted with the dissenters. This left the outcome the same as in Levy
since the five remaining members voted as they had in Levy. Judge Desmond voted
with the majority in Levy and Judge Dye with the dissent.
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confinement of the victims for periods of from ten to fifteen hours
did not play a significant part in the crime. The court argued that
defendant's intent was to molest his victims and that the time and
method employed was of secondary importance, of itself not sufficient
to sustain a conviction for the independent felony of kidnapping.
To support his conclusion Judge Bergan observed that "[h]ad defen-
dant drugged his victims and taken them to a room in the back of
the pharmacy and there attempted to rape them or make sexual ad-
vances, the crimes would appear more clearly to be attempted rape
or assault."'I5 Had the rape occurred in the back room, however, the
time and distance of confinement would be short, and the kidnapping
aspects would not be flagrant when compared with the underlying
felony of rape.16
The result in Lombardi could lead one to suggest that a criminal
would be well advised to incapacitate his victim by pill, drug, or chloro-
form before raping her. The resulting charge of assault in the second de-
gree would appear to be a fair trade for eliminating the chance of an
outcry by the victim. In addition, this would allow the assailant more
time to effect an escape since the unfortunate woman might not be
discovered until she returned to consciousness. As an alternative idea,
the rapist could utilize the ten- to fifteen-hour time period permitted
in Lombardi to drive the woman halfway across the state and back.
Any remote spot that was found during the trip would suffice as the
actual place for the rape. Granted the cynicism of this example, the
state would be hard pressed to sustain a kidnapping charge in view
of the language used in Lombardi.
Judge Burke wrote the dissenting opinion for the three-man
minority in Lombardi, as he had in Levy. Since the majority in
Lombardi based their decision on what they had held in Levy, it was
necessary for Judge Burke to review that case. With a burst of optimism,
he suggested that the majority in Levy sought only to overrule the
rationale that led to the decision in Florio, not to criticize the result.
The legally incorrect rationale of Florio was suggested to be that "[t]he
confinement and detention in the automobile for a short time, coupled
with the intent, brings the case within the purview of the statute."'1
In support of his conclusion, Judge Burke cited the Levy escape clause:
"There may well be situations in which actual kidnapping in this sense
15 20 N.Y.2d at 270-71, 229 N.E.2d at 208, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
16 It should be noted that Judge Bergan, with his strong concern for trends in
kidnapping cases, ignored completely People v. Langdon, 52 Cal. 2d 425, 841 P.2d 803
(1959), discussed at text accompanying notes 38-39 infra.
17 20 N.Y.2d at 278, 229 N.E.2d at 210, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 524, quoting People v. Florio,
801 N.Y. 46, 50, 92 N.E2d 881, 883 (1950).
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can be established in connection with other crimes where there has
been a confinement or restraint amounting to kidnapping to consummate
the other crime."' 8
Having determined that felonious kidnapping could be upheld in
Florio without contradicting the holding in Levy, it was a simple
process to decide that felonious kidnapping should be sustained in
Lombardi. Judge Burke coined the phrase "Levy de minimis"'19 to
characterize those cases in which the kidnapping aspects are incidental
and secondary to the other felony that was committed. He did not
want felonious kidnapping sustained in this type of case. However,
Judge Burke urged that kidnapping convictions be sustained in those
cases in which the forced confinement and detention exceed the amount
present in Levy (i.e., "Levy de minimis"). If twenty-seven blocks and
twenty minutes had become, as Judge Burke urged, the line at which
kidnapping merges with the underlying felony, felonious kidnapping
convictions should have been upheld in both Florio and Lombardi.
From a standpoint of convenience, it would be advantageous if a
"Levy de minimis" rule could be sustained. If the Levy majority in-
tended to overrule the rationale of Florio alone, however, it is logical to
assume that they would have said so. The precise phrase employed was:
"We now overrule People v. Florio .... "20 In addition, if a properly
reasoned Florio would have supported convictions for both kidnapping
and the underlying felony, it is strange that the Levy majority did not
mention a properly reasoned Florio as an example when enunciating
the exception to the merger rule. Finally, if the Levy majority had
intended that a well reasoned Florio should support independent con-
victions via a "Levy de minimis" rule, it is highly unlikely that in
Lombardi kidnapping charges would have been dismissed without an
explanation as to why the "Levy de minimis" rule had been abandoned.
The conclusion that there never was a "Levy de minimis" rule is
inescapable. Once it is conceded that a detention in excess of the one
which occurred in Loambardi would be necessary to constitute both the
independent felony of kidnapping and the separate underlying felony,
the likelihood of encountering such a situation becomes remote, People
v. Black notwithstanding.2
1
18 20 N.Y.2d at 274, 229 N.E2d at 210, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 524, quoting People v. Levy,
15 N.Y.2d 159, 165, 204 N..2d 842, 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (1965).
19 20 N.Y.2d at 274, 229 N.E2d at 210, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
2D People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 204 N.E2d 842, 844, 256 N.Y.S2d 793, 796
(1965).
21 See, e.g., People v. Hatch, 25 App. Div. 2d 606, 267 N.Y.S.2d 651 (4th Dep't
1966).
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On January 16, 1969, the New York Court of Appeals handed
down what almost undoubtedly is their final word on pre-September 1,
1967, kidnapping merger cases, 22 People v. Miles23 The four defendants
in the Miles case attempted to murder an epileptic, mentally defective
drifter by injecting lye into his bloodstream with a homemade hypoder-
mic needle. The victim had incurred the enmity of the defendants by
disposing of heroin he was supposed to keep for them. In addition, he
had witnessed a murder in which two of the present defendants were
implicated. The bizarre and unsuccessful injection occurred in a New-
ark, New Jersey, apartment around 10 p.m., after which the victim was
placed in a car trunk.24 The first stop for the car was the Jersey City
Meadows. The intent appeared to be to pour gasoline on the victim
and set him afire, but the sound of oncoming pedestrians scared the
defendants. So they placed the body back in the trunk and drove to
New York. At 2:40 a.m., while the defendants were in a Harlem bar, a
policeman passing by the car heard thumping sounds from the trunk
and investigated. Arrest of the defendants followed shortly.
After affirming the kidnapping conviction, Judge Breitel employs
Miles as a vehicle to discuss the Levy-Lombardi cycle of cases, but it
does not appear that he has at all clarified the problems posed by these
cases.2 5 If anything he leads the issue into further obscurity by his
rationalization for the decision affirming the kidnapping conviction in
Miles:
Brooks [the victim] testified to an extensive trip, first, presumably to
the Jersey City Meadows and then to upper Manhattan. The more
complicated nature of the asportation, with changes in purposes
and direction, first to a place in New Jersey, and then to New
York, for purposes connected with but not directly instrumental
to the attempt to kill Brooks, removes this case from the exception
of the Levy-Lombardi rule.2 6
22 It is unlikely that any more cases of this type, occurring before the new statute
was enacted in New York, will reach the New York Court of Appeals at this late date.
23 23 N.Y.2d 527, 245 N.E.2d 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d 913, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 948 (1969).
24 There was much controversy at the trial as to whether the defendants knew that
their murder attempt had failed, since one cannot "kidnap" a dead body. The fact that
they bound and gagged the victim before placing him in the car trunk would indicate
they knew that he was alive.
25 Judge Breitel's discussion concludes:
In short, the Levy-Lombardi rule was designed to prevent gross distortion of
lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess of prosecutorial zeal.
It was not designed to merge "true" kidnappings into other crimes merely
because the kidnappings were used to accomplish ultimate crimes of lesser or
equal or greater gravity. Moreover, it is the rare kidnapping that is an end in
itself; almost invariably there is another ultimate crime.
23 N.Y.2d at 540, 245 NXE.2d at 695, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
26 Id. at 539, 245 N.E.2d at 694, 297 N.YS.2d at 921.
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This reasoning ignores the absence of any felony committed in New
York with which kidnapping can merge. Certainly felonies were com-
mitted in violation of federal and New Jersey laws, but except for the
extraneous felony of carrying firearms without a license, nothing other
than kidnapping occurred in New York. Once this fact is ascertained
and given full weight, kidnapping can be affirmed in Miles for either, or
perhaps both, of two reasons. First, the case may come under the au-
thority of Hope and Small, since nothing other than kidnapping ap-
pears from the facts. Second, there may have been a violation of Penal
Law section 1250(3),27 which until later repealed provided that kid-
napping occurs when a person is abducted without the state and de-
tained within it, although there is the problem whether one can
"abduct" a male. The only reason that will not justify kidnapping as
a felony in Miles is the one proposed by Judge Bergan; the case appears
to come to the right decision by the wrong means.
It is necessary to terminate the chronological treatment of New
York's kidnapping merger problems with crimes committed as of
September 1, 1967. The new kidnapping statute28 that became effective
on that day cannot be evaluated effectively without reference to the
group of cases that have dealt with this question in California and those
states subscribing to California's view on kidnapping merger. Before
ending discussion of the New York situation, however, a few observa-
tions are in order concerning the problems that bothered the New
York Court of Appeals.
It would be incorrect to characterize the Levy majority as willing
to minimize true kidnapping. The Court of Appeals has acted without
reluctance both when ransom, reward, or murder appears to be the
motive for the forced detention and when no motive appears and from
the facts it is reasonable to conclude that some form of kidnapping was
the motive for the forced detention. Only in those cases in which
another felony such as rape or robbery is present, in addition to a pos-
sible kidnapping, does the Levy majority become skitterish and tend to
balk at a double conviction for kidnapping and the separate, underlying
felony.29
The reluctance of the Levy majority can be understood. It is
true that technical acts of kidnapping occur in many rapes, robberies,
and forcible assaults, but often the criminal is not aware of this fact
27 N.Y. Laws 1965, ch. 321, § 3 (repealed 1967).
28 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135 (McKinney 1967).
29 Kidnapping is not the only area in which New York is having merger problems.
Judge Bergan has also been struggling with this problem in rape cases. See People
v. Moore, 23 N.Y.2d 565, 245 N.E.2d 710, 297 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1969).
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and did not intend a kidnapping as such. The criminal's intent is not
controlling 0 but is a factor when the kidnapping aspects of the case
are minimal. We are not dealing with a situation in which the criminal
will not be punished if the kidnapping conviction is reversed; he still
must pay the penalty for the underlying rape, robbery, or forcible
assault that was committed. 1 Considering the broad discretion given
to jurists to assess prison terms, paroles, suspended sentences, and con-
secutive sentences, it is not necessary to stretch the application of the
kidnapping statutes merely to assure that the criminal is sentenced to
a prison term commensurate with the gravity of his offense. A maximum
sentence for rape, robbery, or forcible assault should suffice if this is
essentially the only crime committed. But it is questionable whether
good judgment is being used when residents of the state can be con-
fined against their will for periods ranging from twenty minutes to
fifteen hours; or driven for distances ranging from twenty-seven city
blocks to a trip from Manhattan to Queens; or arguably driven half
way across the state and back, at the sole discretion of their captors,
without added criminal liability attaching. The Levy majority usurped
the power of the New York Legislature. In effect, the court by judicial
interpretation wrote a new kidnapping statute for New York.82
II
THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH TO MERGER
Historically, California's approach to the problems occurring when
an act of kidnapping and an underlying felony are present in the same
case resembles the "hang them high" theory so popular with vigilantes in
that state a century before. Unlike New York, California has a separate,
80 Since 1960, the intent of the criminal controls on the possibility of consecutive
sentencing in California but not in New York. For a detailed discussion on this point.
see the dissent of Justice Schauer in People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 763, 376 P.2d
449, 464, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 488 (1962). See also Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 19, 357 P.2d
839, 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (1960); In re Hayes, 70 Cal. 2d 604, 451 P.2d 430, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1969); People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 140 NxE2d 282, 159
N.Y.S.2d 203 (1957).
81 Where conviction for the underlying felony is doubtful because of evidentiary
problems, the prosecution may find a kidnapping charge appealing. The question re-
mains as to when it is unethical to use the higher charge to cure a deficiency in proof
of the underlying felony.
32 The more appropriate judicial response was set forth by Justice Cardozo in
Anderson v. Wilson, 289 US. 20, 27 (1933): "We do not pause to consider whether a
statute differently conceived and framed would yield results more consonant with fair-
ness and reason. We take the statute as we find it."
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distinct law dealing with crimes that encompass both an act of kidnap-
ping and an act of robbery. Section 209 of the California Penal Code
provides in part that "any person who kidnaps or carries away any in-
dividual to commit robbery" will be sentenced to death or life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole if the victim receives bodily harm.
If the victim does not receive bodily harm, the mandatory penalty is life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole. It is essential to note
that it is the intent to rob, and not the commission of bodily harm, that
is the essential element of this offshoot of the standard kidnapping stat-
ute. Therefore, section 209 does not apply if the underlying felony is
rape or assault without the added element of robbery. No matter how
flagrant the attack, if there is no robbery, section 209 does not apply.
So long as the element of robbery is present, California courts
have not hesitated to affirm section 209 convictions in cases in which
the kidnapping aspects were of a minimal enough nature to give the
Levy majority nightmares. In People v. Raucho3 it was held, as an
alternate ground for the decision, that forcing victims to cross a street
and enter an automobile constituted "kidnapping and carrying away."
In People v. Cook3 4 the dragging of a victim from a sidewalk into an
adjacent house constituted kidnapping. In People v. Melendrez'5 a
forced walk of fifty to seventy-five feet constituted kidnapping. In
People v. Shields3 6 evidence that the defendant carried a child from
the front of a house to the roof supported a conviction for kidnapping.
In People v. Oganesoff3 7 evidence that the defendant forcibly carried
the victim into his house from an autombile in front of the house
supported a kidnapping conviction.
People v. Langdon,as a case similar to Lombardi in fact pattern,
typifies the difference in the approaches of New York and California to
the problem of merger. In Langdon, California found kidnapping when
a saleswoman was dragged into the back room and rape was attempted
after defendant had robbed her cash register. In Loambardi the New
York Court of Appeals thought that if the employee had been dragged
into the back room and raped, the kidnapping aspects should be ignored
despite drugging and a period of confinement. It is plain from the tenor
of the Lombardi opinion that if the added element of robbery were
present in Lombardi, as it was in Langdon, the Court of Appeals would
33 8 Cal. App. 2d 655, 47 P.2d 1108 (1935).
34 18 Cal. App. 2d 625, 64 P.2d 449 (1957).
35 25 Cal. App. 2d 490, 77 P.2d 870 (1938).
36 70 Cal. App. 2d 628, 161 P.2d 475 (1945).
37 81 Cal. App. 2d 709, 184 P.2d 953 (1947).
38 52 Cal. 2d 425, 341 P.2d 303 (1959).
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have been even more confident that the kidnapping aspects of the case
were secondary and did not merit an independent conviction. 9
People v. Knowles40 is an even more extreme example of the
polarity existing between New York and California on this issue. A
fair reading of the facts in Knowles establishes without a doubt that
any movement of the detained victims of the robbery was very slight
and occurred only to obtain easier access to the money sought. The
California Supreme Court indicated that it was powerless to reverse
the kidnapping conviction, since, under section 209 as it read in 1950,
mere detention without movement was sufficient to constitute kid-
napping. This meant that so-called "standstill kidnapping" could be
found in any robbery case; detention at least for the instant neces-
sary to rob the victim always occurs. A district attorney could thus
recommend to the grand jury that a count for a violation of section
209 be added to any robbery indictment to which he desired to add
further punishment.
The California Supreme Court in Knowles did not attempt to
usurp the function of the legislature by refusing to apply the clear
words of the statute. It sustained the kidnapping conviction but made
it clear that it felt that the district attorney had abused the trust of his
office by prosecuting the defendant on kidnapping charges. The court
extended an invitation to the legislature to amend section 209 to make
both movement and detention essential elements of the offense, and
the legislature quickly adopted the suggestion. 41 This effectively elim-
inated the possibility of "standstill kidnapping" under section 209.
By the time Knowles's accomplice, the notorious Caryl Chessman,
came to trial, the revised section 209 had become law. Both Knowles
and Chessman benefited from this change. Since Knowles's section 209
conviction was still in the appeal process, the "standstill kidnapping"
charge was dismissed. Chessman never was tried on this charge. Chess-
man was tried on seventeen other felony counts, including two charges
of violations of section 209 in which movement did occur. In a dramatic,
often raucous trial in which Chessman acted as his own attorney, the
jury returned a guilty verdict on each of the indictments. It is often
alleged that Chessman went to the gas chamber for dragging a woman
twenty-two feet. Those who bemoan Chessman's fate solely for the short
distance involved lose sight of the fact that in the other case upon which
30 As recently as May 1969, the California Supreme Court affirmed the authority
of Langdon and demonstrated that § 209 is alive and well by applying it in People v.
Coogler, 71 A.C. 165, 454 P.2d 681, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969).
40 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950).
41 See CAL. PENAL ConE § 209 (West 1955).
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the death sentence could be predicated, the victim was driven a consider-
able distance.42 In both violations of the amended section 209, all three
elements necessary to satisfy that statute were present. Chessman robbed
both victims, detained and moved them against their will, and, as to the
element that permits the death sentence, subjected his victims to bodily
harm (i.e., rape). The definitive statement concerning the amount of
movement necessary to constitute kidnapping under the California
school of thought is contained in the Chessman case: "it is the fact, not
the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnapping in this
state."43
This rule from the Chessman case was not diluted until 1960,
when Neal v. State4 was decided. The decision had a profound effect
on section 209 even though the case had nothing to do with kidnapping.
Neal involved the interpretation of a sentencing statute, section 654
of the California Penal Code, and restricted severely the power of Cal-
ifornia courts to impose sentences running consecutively for multiple
crimes arising from the same transaction. It proclaimed that, in the
future, the intent and motive of the actor would control on the question
whether the sentences imposed for the violation of specified criminal
statutes should be served one after the other, or alternatively, whether
some or all of those sentences should be served at the same time as the
longest sentence. As explained in a 1969 motor vehicle case:
The key to application of section 654 is in the phrase "act or
omission": a defendant may be punished only once for each distinct
"act or omission" committed. There have been numerous attempts
in the cases to define a single "act," with varying degrees of clarity.
Section 654 has been held to apply, for example, where the multiple
violations are "necessarily included offenses" . . . and where there
is a single "intent and objective" underlying a course of criminal
conduct.... 45
Consequently, a man convicted in California for the felonies of robbery
and kidnapping with the intent to rob (section 209) will be obliged to
serve only the time prescribed in the more severe sentence (section 209)
unless it is proved that there was a specific intent to rob and, in addition,
a specific intent to kidnap the victim in order to facilitate the robbery.
Where the victim receives bodily harm, or where defendant had a
multiple intent and objective, the multiple sentencing statute has no
practical effect on section 209. In the first case, defendant must be
42 People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951).
43 Id. at 192, 288 P.2d at 1017.
44 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960).
45 In re Hayes, 70 Cal. 2d 604, 605-06, 451 P.2d 430, 431, 75 Cal. Rptr. 790, 791 (1969).
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sentenced to at least life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole; in the second, consecutive sentencing is allowed. But where
defendant pursues a single intent and objective and no harm results
to his victim, the multiple sentencing statute greatly mitigates his
punishment. Defendant can be sentenced only for the most serious
crime of which he is convicted; 46 assuming the section 209 violation
is the most serious, the only sentence he can be given is life with the
possibility of parole. Since no other sentences intervene to extend the
time, parole is possible after seven years.47 Thus, despite California's
rigorous application of section 209, the multiple sentencing statute
often makes the consequences of kidnapping and robbery not much
more serious in California than they were in New York before the
1967 statutory change.
States that follow the so-called "California approach" to kidnap-
ping merger cases have remained more faithful to the hard line on
this subject than their prototype. In State v. Brown,48 a 1957 Kansas
case, a young man who forced a woman to drive out of a parking lot
into an alley where he raped her was convicted of kidnapping. Ten
years later, in State v. Ayers,49 the Kansas Supreme Court sustained a
kidnapping conviction for which eleven feet of movement before a rape
was the only basis. The Ayers case is the only high court case in a dif-
ferent jurisdiction that has reviewed the Levy case. The defense in
Ayers cited Levy as a ground for discarding the Brown case in Kansas,
but the court rejected this argument. Noting that Levy was a four to
three decision, the court reaffirmed its support for both the Florio0
case and the California rule that it is the fact of forceful removal of
the victim, not the distance involved, that constitutes kidnapping. The
court in Ayers observed that if there was dissatisfaction with the Kansas
kidnapping statute, it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, to
rectify the unsatisfactory parts.
Arizona also interprets its kidnapping laws strictly. State v. Taylor51
indicates that the State of Arizona is so concerned about forced deten-
46 A statement in the Neal case could be read as allowing sentencing for one of the
lesser convictions: "If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant
may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one." 55 Cal. 2d at
19, 357 P.2d at 843-44, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12 (emphasis added). It is now clear that the
most stringent sentence must be imposed. In re Ward, 64 Cal. 2d 672, 414 P.2d 400, 51
Cal. Rptr. 272 (1966).
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 (West Cum. Supp. 1968).
48 181 Kan. 575, 312 P.2d 832 (1957). The conviction was reversed on other grounds. Id.
49 198 Kan. 467, 426 P.2d 21 (1967).
50 People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950). See text at notes 2-6 supra.
51 82 Ariz. 289, 312 P.2d 162 (1957).
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tion of its citizens that it would not object to a kidnapping conviction
even in a "standstill kidnapping" case. In a more recent Arizona case,
State v. Jacobs,52 defendant surprised the victim in the bathroom of
her house trailer and forced her to go out to the porch. He then brought
her back through the house to the cabana where he raped her. The
Arizona Supreme Court sustained separate rape and kidnapping con-
victions. The statement in the Chessman case that "it is the fact of forc-
ible removal, not the distance, that establishes the crime of kidnap-
ping" 53 is mentioned as authority.
III
NEw YoRK's CURRENT APPROACH TO MERGER
The 1967 revision of New York's kidnapping statute by the Tem-
porary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code
was part of a much larger, even more ambitious enterprise. Although
a cogent codification of New York kidnapping law would be, in itself,
a herculean task, the Temporary Commission was established in order
to facilitate the passing of "a revised, simplified body of substantive
laws relating to crimes and offenses in the state, as well as a revised,
simplified code of rules and procedures relating to criminal and quasi-
criminal actions and proceedings." 54 Since the Commission was involved
in a detailed consideration of a multitude of criminal statutes,5 it was
not realistic to expect that it would be able to devote a sufficient amount
of time to the kidnapping statutes to ensure a definitive statement on
the law of kidnapping merger.
The basic framework of the new kidnapping statute is discussed
in the practice commentary to article 135 of the revised Penal Code:
This article materially revises the crime of kidnapping and
presents a new scheme of offenses designed to distinguish between
various types of "kidnapping" conduct....
Basically, this is accomplished by creating a "kidnapping"
crime divided into two degrees and flanking it by two new and
lesser if somewhat similar offenses, entitled "unlawful imprison-
52 93 Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998 (1963).
53 People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 192, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (1951), cited in
State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 341-42, 380 P.2d 998, 1002 (1963).
54 N.Y. Laws 1961, ch. 346, § 2.
55 In addition to changes in the kidnapping statute, the Temporary Commission
recommended substantial changes in the sentencing laws, abolishing the crime of adultery,
changing the habitual offenders provision, eliminating the second-degree murder statute,
and many other changes in the New York Penal Law and Criminal Code.
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ment" and "custodial interference," each of which is also defined
in two degrees.56
By establishing six kidnapping categories and attempting to fit all the
various species of false imprisonment into these six categories, the
statute does not confront directly the problem of merger. This is un-
fortunate, because kidnapping cases are troublesome principally when
another crime is involved as well; the effectiveness of a kidnapping
statute depends principally on its usefulness in cases of this type. Had
the Commission been assigned no task other than to rehabilitate the
kidnapping laws, it might have been able to establish the genus of
the crime and then set up a group of categories to encompass all the
conceivable varieties. Of necessity, this could not be done by the pres-
ent Commission. The paucity of references to kidnapping problems in
other states indicates that no attempt was made to define the genus of
the crime. Since the Commission did not attack the roots of the prob-
lem, it is unlikely that the new statute will provide a total remedy in
this field. Already it has been necessary to amend the statute in a couple
of instances,57 and, as will be demonstrated, difficulties remain.
Surprisingly, second-degree kidnapping, rather than first-degree
kidnapping, is now the basic kidnapping offense in New York.5s The
definition of second-degree kidnapping is simplicity itself: "A person
is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another
person." 59 For the purpose of this new kidnapping statute, the phrase
"to abuct" is defined to mean: "to restrain a person with intent to pre-
vent his liberation by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place
where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use
physical force."6' 0 Part (b) of this definition seems fatally broad. If a
mere threat of physical violence constitutes an abduction satisfying the
second-degree kidnapping requirements, New York has unwittingly
mired itself in the legal quicksand to which California fell victim in the
Knowles6s case. Second-degree kidnapping is a class B felony under the
new statute, carrying with it a maximum possible sentence of twenty-
five years in prison. It is next to impossible to conceive of a rape, assault,
56 N.Y. PENAL LAw art. 135 (McKinney 1967) (practice commentary).
57 N.Y. Laws 1967, ch. 681, § 78; N.Y. Laws 1967, ch. 791.
58 Kidnapping in the second degree embraces the entire spectrum of genuine kid-
napping conduct, including the three more heinous forms selectively predicated as a
basis for first-degree kidnapping (§ 135.25) and many more. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 13520
(McKinney 1967) (practice commentary).
59 Id. § 135.20.
60 Id. § 135.00.
61 People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950). See text at notes 40-41 supra.
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or armed robbery in which physical force is not used or threatened. In
each of these instances, the district attorney is now free to press the
grand jury for a second-degree kidnapping indictment. Only the district
attorney's discretion and moral responsibility stand between the crim-
inal and this unjust fate.62
"Standstill kidnapping" is another problem. Although it seems
dear from the general tenor of the new statute and its accompanying
commentary that it was not intended to create such a crime, the defini-
tion of "abduction" makes no reference to movement. New York ought
to amend its statute as California amended section 209 after the Knowles
case. In this manner it will be made clear that movement, as well as
forced detention or the threat or use of force, is prerequisite to a kid-
napping violation.63 The amendment should also treat the problem
of how much movement is required; this problem remains to some
extent in California and will undoubtedly haunt New York until it
is faced directly.
A backhanded attempt at solving the problem of merger was made
in section 135.25 of the new statute. This subsection sets forth three
situations in which the twenty-five year maximum sentence for second-
degree kidnapping is considered an inadequate deterrent. It is only in
these three instances that first-degree kidnapping will be found under
the new statute in New York. They are kidnappings for reward or
ransom, kidnappings during which the victim dies, and most abductions
of more than twelve hours duration. First-degree kidnapping is a class A
felony under the new sentencing scheme, carrying with it a sentence of
life imprisonment unless the death penalty is prescribed.
In the problem of merger, the twelve-hour provision is most im-
portant. The practice commentary for this section makes it clear that
the choice of twelve hours as the dividing line was purely arbitrary, 64
but twelve hours appears to be rather high. Levy, Florio, Black, and at
least one of the attacks in Lombardi would not qualify as first-degree
62 A recent law review case note has suggested that Levy and Lombardi still con-
trol kidnapping merger questions in New York. 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604 (1968). The
unambiguous wording of the new statute and the history of trouble that California
encountered with a similar statute, however, indicate that Levy and Lombardi are no
longer controlling in New York. The Court of Appeals passed up an opportunity to
clarify this point when it decided Miles. Another approach would be for the court to
call for a legislative amendment spelling out the time and distance requirements for
merger in second-degree kidnapping cases. See, e.g., People v. Knowles, 85 Cal. 2d 175,
180, 183, 217 P.2d 1, 4 (1950), where Chief Judge Traynor said that legislative action
rather than judicial interpretation was the remedy if § 209 were regarded as too harsh.
63 Of course, the secreting of a person with the requisite intent will constitute kid-
napping even if the accused does not move the victim.
64 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 185.25 (McKinney 1967) (practice commentary).
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kidnapping under this interpretation. Although the dividing line must
be substantial in order to separate cases with a genuine kidnapping
flavor (to use the words of the practice commentary) from cases that
are little more than robbery or rape, it is hard to believe that there is
not a genuine kidnapping flavor in Florio, Black, Lombardi, and even
Levy. Certainly the terrified victims in Levy had -no idea that they were
to be released after twenty minutes. During this period they felt that
they were being kidnapped.
In view of New York's liberal parole regulations it is questionable
whether second-degree kidnapping affords adequate punishment in the
major cases listed above. Defendants will, however, be sent to prison
for a substantial length of time. The more serious problem occurs on
the other end of the ladder. At what point is the detention and move-
ment of the victim such a minor consequence of the underlying felony
that it should not be punished as second-degree kidnapping? The line
must be drawn short of truly incidental movement. Until this is done,
the New York statute will be seriously deficient. If the New York Legis-
lature merely follows the example of the revised section 209 in Cal-
ifornia and adds movement of an unspecified amount as a prerequisite
for kidnapping, it will have provided a stop-gap solution. Unfortunately
an excellent opportunity to make a definitive statement on the element
of merger in the law of kidnapping will have been lost.
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